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The Akimel O’odham (Pima) Indians and their ancestors, the HuHuGum, practiced irrigated agriculture in central Arizona for over two 
thousand years.  In the late 1700s, the Peeposh 
(Maricopa) Indians formed a political, economic, and 
military confederation with the O’odham.  The Pima-
Maricopa Confederation was affluent before the 
arrival of Euro-Americans.  Following their arrival, 
the Euro-Americans diverted the Gila and Salt 
Rivers, which deprived the Confederation of water 
it needed to sustain its agriculture. Consequently, 
the members of the Confederation were reduced 
to poverty, malnutrition, and endemic diabetes. 
The economic basis of Pimas and Maricopas were 
effectively destroyed by the illegal diversions.
The restoration of water to Pimas and Maricopas 
is unparalleled in the history of Native Americans in 
the United States and is especially dramatic in the arid 
Southwest.  The determination, tenacity, and patience 
of Pimas and Maricopas in litigation and negotiations 
caused this amazing turn of events to occur.
The Gila River Indian Reservation was established 
for the Pimas and Maricopas in 1859 and expanded 
seven times between 1876 and 1915.  The Gila 
River Indian Community has battled for many 
decades to regain part of the water that was once 
theirs in order to reacquire economic independence 
and return to their agrarian lifestyle.  The most 
recent of the Community’s battles to regain its lost 
water is the General Adjudication of All Rights to 
Use Water in the Gila River System and Source 
(Gila River Adjudication), first filed in 1974.  The 
Winters federally reserved water rights doctrine is 
an important component of the Community’s legal 
efforts.  The Community has followed a dual path 
of assertive litigation and arduous negotiation in its 
endeavors to reclaim its water.  It has successfully 
prevailed in many of the treacherous shoals of 
water rights litigation and is close to entering the 
safe harbor of a complete settlement of its water 
rights claims.  
We will discuss the history of the Gila River 
Indian Community’s impending water rights 
settlement and outline the steps that remain in 
bringing this long and tortured process to fruition. 
In order to understand the backdrop against which 
negotiations were conducted, it is important to 
discuss Arizona water law and the Winters doctrine 
and then examine the procedures that have taken 
place to date in the Gila River Adjudication.
Arizona Water Law
Mark Twain explained that “Whisky is for drinking 
— Water is for fighting.”  The problem with water in 
the arid western part of the United States is that there 
just isn’t enough of it. “ The essence of western water 
law is that water, not land, is the scarce resource.”1 
In the State of Arizona, water is public property and 
private parties may only own the right to use the 
water.2  Private parties acquire the right to use water 
through the prior appropriation doctrine.3 
The essence of prior appropriation is “first in time 
is first in right,” that is, the person first appropriating 
the water has the better right.  A senior appropriator 
has the right to take all of its “diversion undiminished 
in quantity and quality” before a junior appropriator 
can take any water.4 The water appropriated must be 
put to a beneficial use.5 Such beneficial uses include: 
domestic, municipal, irrigation, stock watering, 
water power, recreation, wildlife, nonrecoverable 
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Eastern states, where water shortages are less 
frequent, use the riparian doctrine to allocate the use 
of water between conflicting claimants.  Simply put, 
a party who owns land adjoining a water source may 
make reasonable use of that water, so long as the 
use does not injure a downstream party or interfere 
with a downstream riparian owner’s use of water. 
Under the riparian doctrine, if there is an occasional 
shortage of water, the users share the shortage pro 
rata.  As a territory, Arizona unequivocally rejected 
the riparian doctrine.7  With the adoption of its 
constitution, and embracing prior appropriation, the 
State of Arizona declared that “[t]he common law 
doctrine of riparian water rights shall not obtain or 
be of any force or effect in the State.”8  
Arizona’s version of the prior appropriation 
doctrine has one unusual notion.  In most prior 
appropriation states, the doctrine applies to both 
surface and underground water.  As  law professor 
Robert Glennon discusses elsewhere in this issue, 
Arizona has a divided system in which some 
underground water is appropriable and other 
underground water is not.  While this split system 
was recognized early in Arizona’s judicial history, 
its first “clear” definition was provided in Maricopa 
County Municipal Water Conservation District 
v. Southwest Cotton Co.9 Underground water 
considered to be so closely related to the surface 
flow as to be a part of the stream is called “subflow” 
and is subject to prior appropriation.  Underground 
water considered not to be closely related to the 
surface flow is called “percolating water” and is 
not subject to prior appropriation.  The obvious 
question is:  How do you tell the different types 
of underground water apart?  The test stated in 
Southwest Cotton was:
Does drawing off the subsurface water tend 
to diminish appreciably and directly the flow 
of the surface stream?  If it does, it is subflow, 
and subject to the same rules of appropriation 
as the surface stream itself; if it does not, then, 
although it may originally come from the waters 
of such stream, it is not, strictly speaking, a part 
thereof, but is subject to the rules applying to 
percolating waters.10  
Early on, Arizona courts recognized that a 
distinction between subflow and percolating waters 
“completely overlook[ed] the hydrological cycle.”11 
Because percolating water is not subject to prior 
appropriation, Smith cannot prevent Jones from 
taking percolating water from beneath Jones’ land, 
even though that taking prevents Smith from using 
his water.  The limit to the right to capture and use 
percolating water is that the water must be used for 
a beneficial purpose on the land from which it is 
drawn.12  Like appropriable water, percolating water 
is not subject to private ownership and “the right 
of the owner of the overlying land is simply to the 
usufruct of the water.”13
Winters Federally Reserved Water 
Rights Doctrine
For a wide variety of legal, political, and economic 
reasons, the prior appropriation doctrine has generally 
been of  limited benefit to Indian tribes in their efforts 
to protect their rights to use water.  In contrast, the 
Winters federally reserved water rights doctrine has 
become an extremely important tool in Indian water 
rights litigation.  The Winters doctrine arose from 
Winters v. United States,14 which was an effort by the 
United States to quantify and protect the water rights 
of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. 
The United States created the Fort Belknap Indian 
Reservation, in Montana, to serve as a permanent home 
and abiding place for Gros Ventre and Assiniboine 
Indians.  The Milk River runs through the reservation. 
After the reservation was created, but before the 
United States filed suit to protect the Indians’ rights to 
use water, numerous non-Indian settlers appropriated 
the use of virtually all the water.  If the water rights 
of the reservation were limited to prior appropriation 
rights, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Indians would 
have been left high and dry.  
The United States Supreme Court noted that 
the Indians had occupied and used a much larger 
area than the reservation, and that this wider area 
had been adequate to support them in a nomadic 
lifestyle.  The Court was aware of the federal policy 
compelling Indians to exchange a pastoral lifestyle 
and that, on the arid lands of the reservation, this 
could be accomplished through irrigated agriculture. 
The Supreme Court concluded:
 
The power of the government to reserve the 
waters and exempt them from appropriation 
under the state laws is not denied, and could 
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not be. That the government did reserve them 
we have decided, and for a use which would be 
necessarily continued through the years.15 
The Winters doctrine16 is different from, but 
interrelated with, the prior appropriation doctrine. 
The quantity and priority of Winters water rights 
are determined under different rules than the 
quantity and priority of prior appropriation water 
rights. Indian and other federal reservations and 
non-federal parties, however, almost always take 
their water from common sources.  Once the rights 
are established, under their respective rules, they 
are administered together. The following are the 
important facts that are unique to Winters rights .
 
(1)  “Reserved rights are ‘federal water rights’ 
and ‘are not dependent upon state law or state 
procedures.’  . . .  This merely reflects the tension 
between the doctrines of prior appropriation and 
Indian reserved rights.  When reserved rights are 
properly implied, they arise without regard to 
equities that may favor competing water users.”17
(2)  Prior appropriation rights are always a matter 
of express intent.  “[A]ppropriation is the intent to 
take [water], accompanied by some open, physical 
demonstration of the intent, and for some valuable 
use.”18 Winters rights are implied.  There does not 
need to be any express intention to reserve water 
contained in the statute or executive order creating 
the Indian reservation.  Reservation of water rights 
is implied through the creation or expansion of an 
Indian reservation.19
(3)  While the date of a right under prior 
appropriation is the date upon which the water was 
first put to beneficial use, the date of a right under 
the Winters doctrine is the date on which the Indian 
reservation was created or expanded.  If a prior 
appropriation right existed prior to the date of the 
creation of the reservation, it is senior to the Winters 
right.  If a prior appropriation right did not come 
into existence until after the date of the creation of 
the reservation, it is junior to the Winters right, even 
if the date and amount of the Winters right was not 
actually quantified until many years later.20  The 
Winters right comes into existence as of the date of 
the creation of the Indian reservation, without the 
necessity of diversion or beneficial use.21
(4)  Prior appropriation water rights can be lost if 
they are not used for a specified period of time (five 
years in Arizona).22  Winters rights are not lost by 
non-use, prior to or following their quantification 
by a competent court.  “The reserved rights are 
open ended and do not depend on actual use to be 
maintained.  Water is therefore available whenever 
needed to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.”23 
“Therefore, reserved water rights are not lost by 
latches, estoppel or adverse possession.”24
 
(5)  The quantity of a prior appropriation water 
right is measured by the amount of water that was 
initially put to beneficial use.  If Jones started using 
60 acre-feet of water on ten acres of land in 1910, 
she would have a right to use 60 acre-feet with a 
1910 priority.  She would have the right to take 
her full 60 acre-feet before an appropriator with a 
1911 priority could take any water.  However, she 
would not be allowed to take 70 acre-feet unless she 
acquired a priority right (with a new priority date) 
for the additional ten acre-feet.
The amount of water reserved for an Indian 
reservation is the amount needed “to satisfy the 
future as well as the present needs of the Indian 
Reservations.”25  Because an Indian reservation 
is intended to be a permanent home and abiding 
place for its Indian inhabitants, the amount of 
water reserved cannot be based on present needs. 
As the United States Supreme Court explained: 
“How many Indians there will be and what their 
future needs will be can only be guessed.”26  The 
standard for quantification of water rights for Indian 
reservations set by the Arizona v. California Court 
was “enough water . . . to irrigate all the practicably 
irrigable acreage on the reservation.”27  
Gila River Adjudication
The filing of a petition in 1974, to adjudicate 
water rights of the Salt River initiated the General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila 
River System and Source.  The case was expanded 
to include the Upper Agua Fria, Upper Gila, Lower 
Gila, and Upper Santa Cruz Rivers.28   This initiated 
the most significant and decisive action with regard 
to water rights in the history of Arizona.  The Gila 
River Adjudication court grappled with not only the 




Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCation
but also began to weigh and adjudicate the water 
rights of Indian tribes in Arizona.  This far reaching 
and comprehensive litigation will be remembered 
as the critical pivotal point in the development of 
water law in Arizona.
“Water litigation is a weed that flowers in the arid 
West.”29  If Jones has a water right with a 1910 priority 
and Smith has a water right with a 1923 priority, 
Jones should be able to take all of her water before 
Smith takes any of his water. A process needs to be 
available for determining the quantity and priority 
of each of their rights, and,  thereafter, for enforcing 
those quantified rights.  From such needs, litigation 
arises. “A water rights adjudication is a proceeding 
to determine the respective priorities of water rights 
on a stream system for purposes of administration. 
[Citation omitted.]  A decree does not confer, but 
rather confirms a pre-existing water right.”30
Before the initiation of the Gila River 
Adjudication, there were numerous local water 
decrees quantifying the respective water rights of 
water users along various isolated segments of the 
Gila River and its tributaries.  These prior decrees 
included:  Kent Decree, Haggard Decree; Benson-
Allison Decree; Ling Decree; Lockwood Decree; 
Doan Decree; Jenkes Decree; Shute Decree; 
San Pedro Decision; Clifford v. Larrieu; Hill v. 
Lenerman; Dyke v. Caldwell; Miller v. Douglas; 
Boquillas Land and Cattle Company v. Saint 
David Cooperative Comm. and Dev. Association; 
Wolf v. Turner; Pyeatt v. Huachuca Queen Mining 
Company; Clarkson and Clarkson v. Wilcox; and 
the Globe Equity Decree. 
All of the waters of the Gila River system are 
interconnected.  Streams flow into the Black River 
which joins the White River, to form the Salt 
River, which is joined by the Verde River, which 
then joins the Gila River.  If a party with a 1993 
prior appropriation right takes water out of the 
Verde River, that user reduces the amount of water 
that is available to fill the senior water rights of a 
party taking Salt River water with a 1910 priority. 
There are insurmountable problems with a series 
of isolated water decrees.  Without river system 
administration, an upstream appropriator with a 
1911 priority right (quantified by Boquillas Land 
and Cattle Company v. Saint David Cooperative 
Comm. and Dev. Association) can take water in 
advance of a downstream appropriator with an 
immemorial water right (quantified by the Globe 
Equity Decree).  Equally problematic is the fact that 
massive numbers of water users in the Gila River 
system have never had their water rights claims 
adjudicated by any court.  
There is only one process that can allow for a fair and 
equitable allocation of the appropriable water of an entire 
river system and source — a general adjudication.  
A general adjudication is a court decree 
which lists every appropriation of water in a 
particular river basin.  The decree states the 
name of the appropriator, the date of the priority 
of the water rights, the amount and purpose of 
the appropriation, the place of diversion of the 
water, the dates and times of the water use, and 
the place of use.”31
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized the 
necessity for a general adjudication: 
The necessity of consolidation and expansion 
of the proceedings is dictated by practical 
considerations unrelated to and, in fact, quite 
different from judicial efficiency.  It might 
indeed be more efficient to conduct separate 
adjudications, each with fewer parties.  Reality 
tells us, however, that in a state with vast amounts 
of arid desert land, and with insufficient water 
to provide all inhabitants with all that they need 
— let alone desire — the allocation of water to 
one claimant, asserting rights to a stream that is 
a tributary to another, will inevitably result in a 
smaller allocation to another claimant to either 
the tributary or the main stream.32
The court also recognized that no general 
adjudication could be effective “if federal water 
claims, especially those of the Indians, [were] 
excluded from the proceeding.”33
The United States Congress made federal 
participation in certain water rights litigation 
mandatory through the adoption of the McCarran 
Amendment.34  This statute provides that “[c]onsent 
is given to join the United States as a defendant in 
any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use 
of water of a river system or other source.”  The 
Arizona Legislature authorized the institution and 
conduct of a general adjudication to determine “the 
nature, extent and relative priority of the water rights 
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of all persons in the river system and source.”35  In 
compliance with the requirements of the McCarran 
Amendment, Arizona Revised Statutes § 45-
251(7) decrees and required “that when rights to 
the use of water or dates of appropriation have 
previously been determined in a prior decree of 
a court, the court shall accept the determination 
of such rights and dates of appropriation as found 
in the prior decree unless such rights have been 
abandoned.”36 
In 1976, the Gila River Indian Community 
filed claims to have its water rights quantified 
under the Winters doctrine, the prior appropriation 
doctrine, and the aboriginal rights doctrine.  The 
Community filed claims for 1,500,000 acre-feet 
of water to be used on the 370,000+ acres of land 
within the Gila River Indian Reservation (GRIR). 
The United States, as trustee for the Gila River 
Indian Community, also filed claims for 1,500,000 
acre-feet of water.
The progress in the Gila River Adjudication 
has been glacial.  While settlements of water 
rights claims have been presented to and approved 
by the trial court, not one contested claim has 
been adjudicated since 1974.  The trial court has 
rendered decisions on a multitude of issues that have 
significant, widespread applicability to all parties in 
the adjudication — including procedural processes, 
Winters claims and subflow.   
Gila I dealt with a plethora of procedural 
issues.  Three of the interlocutory appeals 
before the Arizona Supreme Court dealt with 
subflow and percolating water:  In re General 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the 
Gila River System and Source (Gila II),37 In re 
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water 
in the Gila River System and Source (Gila III),38 
and In re General Adjudication of All Rights to 
Use Water in the Gila River System and Source 
(Gila IV).39
In Gila III, the Arizona Supreme Court determined 
that, while the subflow/ percolating water bifurcated 
system could limit the enforcement rights of state 
prior appropriation claims,  the doctrine does not 
limit the enforcement of Winters rights.  Recognizing 
that “the notion of subflow is an artifice,”40 the Gila 
III Court determined that the arbitrary definitions a 
state gives to water, based upon its location, could 
not restrict the water rights of an Indian or federal 
reservation. 
[I]f the United States implicitly intended, when 
it established reservations, to reserve sufficient 
unappropriated water to meet the reservations’ 
needs, it must have intended that reservation of 
water to come from whatever particular sources 
each reservation had at hand.  The significant 
question for the purpose of the reserved rights 
doctrine is not whether the water runs above or 
below the ground but whether it is necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the reservation.41 
In Southwest Cotton, the Arizona Supreme Court 
provided the standard by which to determine whether 
underground water was subflow or percolating:  “Does 
drawing off the subsurface water tend to diminish 
appreciably and directly the flow of the surface 
stream?”42  Unfortunately, the court did not give the 
means by which anybody could apply that standard. 
Determining whether underground water was subflow 
or percolating went unresolved for decades.
The advent of Arizona’s two general stream 
adjudications (in addition to the Gila River 
Adjudication, the state is adjudicating the Little 
Colorado River) brought this issue to a head.  In 
1987, the trial court determined that the test for 
subflow was whether a well’s pumping for ninety 
days would deplete the stream flow by 50% of the 
amount of water pumped. Gila II unceremoniously 
rejected this test as arbitrary and remanded the 
matter with a directive to try again. Gila II told the 
trial court to consider criteria such as flow direction, 
water level elevation, the gradation of water levels 
over a stream reach, the chemical composition and 
the lack of hydraulic pressure from tributary aquifer 
and basin fill recharge. 
On remand, the trial court held a ten- day hearing 
and considered the criteria set out by Gila II.  The 
trial court provided a workable and reasonably 
accurate definition of the subflow zone — the 
saturated floodplain Holocene alluvium.43  In simple 
terms, the flood- plain Holocene alluvium is the area 
adjacent to a river that has been flooded and washed 
over approximately the last ten thousand years. 
The constant washing process has removed the fine 
particles, leaving coarse sand and gravel.  Water flows 
more easily through these loose soils than it does 
through the cemented soils of the older alluvium. 
Finding that “the ruling comports with hydrological 
reality as it is currently understood,” Gila IV affirmed 
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While the interlocutory appeals were winding 
their way through the Arizona Supreme Court, the 
trial court attempted to make progress.  The trial 
court observed that the Winters rights claims of the 
United States and the various Indian tribes were 
generally very senior based on their creation dates. 
Reasoning that it made sense to resolve the impact 
of these early, potentially large water rights before 
proceeding on to smaller, junior water rights claims, 
the trial court decided to begin processing federal 
and Indian reservation claims.  The Gila River 
Indian Community volunteered to have its water 
rights claims adjudicated first.
The trial court identified two initial issues it 
wanted resolved before taking evidence on the 
relative priority and water duty for each acre of 
GRIR land with water rights claims.  One issue was 
whether there were any prior decrees or agreements 
that limited the water rights claims for GRIR or 
restricted the ability of the Community or the United 
States to advance those claims.  This process resulted 
in seven motions for summary judgment, claiming 
that there were fifteen decrees or agreements that 
limited water rights for GRIR.  
Summary judgment was denied on thirteen of the 
fifteen decrees and agreements.  Summary judgment 
was granted on the claim that the Indian Claims 
Commission Decision in Docket 236-D, deciding that 
the Community was not entitled to damages for loss 
of water from the Salt River prior to 1949, precluded 
the Community and the United States from making 
Winters claims to the surface flow of the Salt River. 
Summary judgment was also granted on the claim that 
the Globe Equity Decree precluded the Community 
from seeking additional water for the 50,000 acres of 
land in the San Carlos Indian Irrigation Project.  The 
court denied the claim that the Globe Equity Decree 
precluded the Community from making claims against 
any parties (other than those in Globe Equity) for the 
remaining 320,000 acres of land in GRIR.  Both of 
those decisions are currently on interlocutory appeal 
before the Arizona Supreme Court.
The second process the trial court authorized, 
with regard to the Community’s and United States’ 
claims for water rights for GRIR, was an analysis 
of the “purpose” for the creation and subsequent 
expansions of the Gila River Indian Reservation. 
The Community’s opponents argued that various 
expansions of GRIR were solely for the purpose of 
grazing or were only intended to provide a buffer 
between the Pima-Maricopa Indians and non-Indians 
and, therefore, the Community was entitled to 
minimal or no water for the lands contained in those 
expansions.  This process was rendered moot by In 
re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water 
in the Gila River System and Source (Gila V).45
In United States v. New Mexico,46 the United 
States Supreme Court determined that the Winters 
doctrine only reserved water for the “primary 
purpose” of a federal reservation and that, if a federal 
reservation needed water for a secondary purpose, 
it had to acquire a water right pursuant to state law. 
In Gila V, the Arizona Supreme Court determined 
that Indian reservations, unlike federal reservations, 
were not subject to a primary vs. secondary purpose 
test.  “Indian reservations, however, are different. 
In its role as trustee of such lands, the government 
must act on the Indians’ benefit.  . . .  The purposes 
of Indian reserved rights . . . are given broader 
interpretation in order to further the federal goal of 
Indian self-sufficiency.”47  Gila V determined that 
the purpose for the creation of Indian reservations 
was to serve “as a ‘permanent home and abiding 
place’ for the Indian people as explained in Winters. 
. . .  Such a construction is necessary for the tribes to 
achieve the twin goals of Indian self-determination 
and economic self-sufficiency.”48
Gila V rejected “practicably irrigable acreage” 
as the sole standard by which Indian reservation 
Winters rights would be measured.  The court 
recognized that Indian tribes and communities would 
use their Winters waters for agricultural production, 
commercial development, industrial, residential, 
and recreational uses, as well as cultural purposes, 
natural resource development, and wilderness. 
Gila V listed a number of non-exclusive factors to 
be considered in quantifying the water rights for 
an Indian reservation, including a tribe’s history 
and culture, the lands’ geography, topography, and 
natural resources, the tribe’s economic base, past 
water use, and present and projected population.49
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gila 
V, the trial court discontinued the process leading to 
a determination of the “purpose” for the Gila River 
Indian Reservation.  Recognizing the significant 
progress that was being made to resolve the Gila 
River Indian Community’s water rights claims, the 
trial court stayed the prosecution of the Community’s 
claims in order to move on to other issues that were 
less likely to be resolved without trials. 
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GRIC Water Rights Settlement Process
The Community followed a two-track process 
in dealing with its water rights claims — vigorous 
litigation and resolute negotiation.  From the 
beginning, the Community realized that it would not 
be able to achieve a fair and reasonable settlement 
if it could not convince the opposing parties that its 
Winters, prior appropriation, and aboriginal water 
rights claims were real and substantial threats to 
their water supplies.  No one was going to negotiate 
a settlement that provided the Community with 
enough water to meet the needs of its members, and 
enough money to build the superstructure necessary 
to deliver and use the water, unless the Community 
could establish that it had a legitimate chance of 
winning an even greater water supply through the 
Gila River Adjudication.  
The Community also recognized that it would 
have to be able to establish a defensible water budget 
and to demonstrate that it could and would use the 
water that was received through settlement.  To that 
end, in 1985, the Community developed a Master 
Plan.    The Master Plan set out how the Community 
intended to use the water, deliver the water, pay for 
the delivery system (including its future operation 
and maintenance costs), and the economic return 
the Community expected from its water resources. 
Over the past two decades, the Community 
has spent incalculable hours meeting with 
representatives of major water users — cities, 
counties, the State of Arizona, mines, irrigation 
districts, power companies, water companies, a 
host of federal agencies, and other Indian tribes 
— working to develop the Gila River Indian 
Community Settlement Agreement.  The process 
involved determining and agreeing to:
•    the water supplies to be used to meet the 653,500 
acre-foot water budget;
•    the sources of funding to pay for the construction, 
operation, and maintenance cost of acquiring and 
delivering the Community’s water;
•  the changes other parties throughout the State 
would make in their water use to protect the 
Community’s water supply; and
•    the conditions upon which the Community would 
grant waivers to other water users — thereby 
giving up the Community’s litigation efforts 
against those settling parties.
It is difficult to describe the complexity of 
negotiating with scores of large water users, who 
often had conflicting needs and wishes.  Often, 
the Community had to mediate disputes between 
other water users in order to get agreement on 
the Community’s settlement needs.  Even after 
substantive issues were resolved, countless 
hours were spent on the precise wording and 
punctuation of each paragraph.  All parties were 
legitimately concerned about the possibility of 
unclear or ambiguous language that would cause 
real problems in the future. 
The Community, and its multitude of associate 
negotiators, finally produced a 320- page settlement 
agreement with 75 exhibits and numerous attachments 
to those exhibits that resolved most of the issues 
between most of the parties.  The Community and 
its throng of fellow travelers then negotiated and 
drafted a 266 page bill that was introduced in the 
Senate and House of Representatives.  Following 
numerous hearings and amendments, the bill was 
passed and signed into law by President Bush on 
December 10, 2004.   
Thereafter, the Community and the other 
interested parties negotiated and drafted legislation 
to be introduced into the Arizona Legislature to 
implement the various provisions necessary to 
protect the Community’s water supplies, including 
limitations on ground water pumping in the areas 
adjoining the Gila River Indian Reservation and 
restrictions on further agricultural development 
on the Gila River and its tributaries upstream of 
Ashurst-Hayden Diversion Dam.  
Having accomplished these enormous tasks, 
the Community has a vast array of activities still 
to accomplish before its settlement becomes 
official.  Some issues in the settlement agreement 
have not been completely finalized, and some of 
the major participants in the process have not yet 
signed onto the agreement.  There are some of 
these parties whose involvement is not crucial to 
the implementation of the settlement.  However, 
resolution of their claims would greatly benefit the 
Community and those who have settled with the 
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The Community is currently reviewing the 
settlement agreement with various parties and 
making changes that are required to conform to the 
provisions in the settlement legislation.  Following 
final completion of this process, the settlement 
agreement will be presented to the Secretary of 
the Interior for formal federal approval.  The 
Community must obtain environmental clearances 
from the appropriate federal agencies for the various 
construction activity that will accompany delivery 
of the Community’s settlement water.  Finally, the 
Community and its new-found allies will present 
the Gila River Indian Community Settlement 
Agreement to the Gila River Adjudication Court 
for its review and approval.  Parties who object to 
the settlement agreement may, at that time, express 
their objections.
Conclusion
For over a century, the Gila River Indian 
Community has been striving to regain the use of 
water that was taken from it by upstream diversions. 
For the past thirty years, the Community has fought 
for its federal and state water rights in the arena of 
the Gila River Adjudication and the Globe Equity 
Decree.  Ultimately, a negotiated settlement was 
developed and water rights and claims were finally 
settled.  For the past twenty years, the Community 
has been in full-time discussions, seeking to 
negotiate a resolution of its water rights claims 
that would provide the Community with the water 
necessary for its future survival, while providing 
the non-Indian parties with the certainty that they 
can divide the water that remains among them.  The 
process has been long and painful, but the end is in 
sight.  The Community looks forward to the day 
when water again flows plentifully in its irrigation 
ditches and some of the natural habitat on the Gila 
River Indian Reservation is re-established.  
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